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Tweak the guiding paradigm

O

ver time, the public has simply ceased to
believe judges when say that they follow
the law, and nothing but. If judges impose their
ideological policy preferences, the argument
goes, why should they be independent from
political controls, when other policymakers are
not? We have reached the point where, when
judges seek to defend the customs and conventions that have guarded against incursions upon
their independence by arguing that “we are
all about the law and nothing else,” the public
response has increasingly become, “No, no, no,
your nose is growing.”
The collapse of independence conventions
was facilitated by what I’ve described earlier
as a protracted erosion of support for the role
of judicial independence in the rule of law
paradigm. One possibility is to shrug, let judicial
independence collapse under its own weight,
and welcome a judiciary that is more responsive
to partisan and majoritarian pressures. That
response would make sense if judicial independence is to blame for its own undoing.
But in my view, the problem does not lie
with judicial independence itself, but with how
judicial independence is conceptualized in the
rule of law paradigm. The long-term solution
is not to jettison judicial independence, but to
tweak the guiding paradigm, in favor of what I
rename a “legal culture paradigm.”
The legal culture paradigm I propose begins
from the premise that judges take law seriously,
and when they announce to the world that they
are doing their best to uphold the law, that is
what they are acculturated to do.
Second, likewise, beginning in law school,
and continuing in practice, future judges are
exposed to pervasive legal indeterminacy. Law
students learn to exploit indeterminacy by
arguing both sides of difficult legal questions,
divorced from their own policy preferences, to
the end of making them more effective advocates in an adversarial system of justice.
Third, future judges, again, beginning as law
students, resolve indeterminate legal questions

with reference to competing policy arguments
that aid them in deciding which of two comparably plausible interpretations of law is best. The
argument judges find most persuasive can be
informed by their background, their education,
their life experience, their common sense, and
their policy perspectives, aided by a strategic
sense of the political context in which the case
arose. That is not judging gone rogue, that is
judging gone right.
The virtue of a legal culture paradigm is that
it defends an independent judiciary in terms
that social science verifies, and the public can
accept. The problem that I’m trying to address is
the problem of pretending that judges just call
balls and strikes. It is more complicated than
that, and the public is able to handle that truth.
But by honestly acknowledging the role that
extralegal influences can play in judicial decision-making, the legal culture paradigm has to
allow for the possibility of gratuitous policymaking, in some cases, in which judges abuse their
independence by disregarding the law that they
are acculturated to follow, knowingly or not, and
imposing their own policy predilections.
Accordingly, the legal culture paradigm needs
to envision a more robust role for accountability,
relative to the rule of law paradigm, to deter that
kind of gratuitous policymaking and preserve
public confidence. Without disputing the role
that Congress plays in promoting accountability, the additional accountability that the legal
culture paradigm envisions can be supplied in
large part by intra-judicial mechanisms already in
place that pose no meaningful threat to judicial
independence.
It is unrealistic to hope that a modest reboot
of the prevailing paradigm can by itself quiet
the polarized partisan political fury and restore
respect for an independent judiciary. In the
short term, we must brace for a period of struggle akin to unrestrained, hardball litigation, in
which pokes to the eye of established judicial
independence conventions by partisans on one
side of the aisle will elicit reciprocal pokes by
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partisans on the other side, in lieu of unheeded
warnings not to poke at all.
Ultimately, however, hardball litigation is
exhausting. Running a government without guiding conventions is chaotic, and therein lies hope.
The more insufferable and unrestrained hardball
gets, the more attractive the alternative of settlement becomes. A key to enabling settlement is
to bring the parties together in a quieter and less
formal setting to promote candor and discourage
posturing for the benefit of external audiences.
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Brookings
Institution hosted a series of conferences in
Williamsburg, Virginia, and elsewhere. Those
conferences brought representatives of all three
branches of government together to discuss
court-related issues for the purpose of improving inter-branch communication and promoting mutual understanding of the challenges
confronting the judiciary.
And so, I look forward to a time when we can
convene a series of tri-branch summits in the
spirit of the Williamsburg conferences, once the
adversaries are willing and receptive to meet.
These summits could address such topics as
the role of an independent and accountable
judiciary in American government; the state of
constitutional conventions that have served to
protect an independent judiciary from encroachment; the need for procedural conventions;
the appointments process; promoting a stable
system of selection; and an independent,
accountable judiciary.
It’s premature to convene these summits
until the populist wave has crested, and the
disputants are prepared to meet and listen.
There is, however, room for optimism that the
current appeal of the Biblical edict, “An eye for
an eye,” will eventually yield the wisdom of
Mahatma Gandhi’s admonition that an eye for
an eye makes the whole world blind.
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